E-RACING RACIAL PROFILING
The lawsuit was eventually dismissed on a pre-trial motion. Justice Cullity was satisfied that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action:
The whole thrust of the articles is that the evidence suggests that racial profiling occurs and that steps must be taken to identify the causes and remove them. In my judgment, the allegedly defamatory comments and innuendos in the articles cannot reasonably be understood as intended to apply to every officer in the TPS. This conclusion destroys the foundation of the plaintiff's cause of action as their claim to have been libelled … depends upon a finding to the contrary. defence lawyer Alan D. Gold to review the Toronto Star's interpretation of the police data. 3 Then, in a well-orchestrated manoeuver, Harvey and Gold attended a Toronto Police Services Board meeting that had been advertised as an opportunity for the Black community to express their profiling concerns, and proclaimed that the newspaper's conclusions were "bogus" and based on "junk science." 4 In addition, the Toronto Police Service Association launched an unprecedented 2.7 billion dollar lawsuit against the Toronto Star. The basis for the lawsuit was, as police union lawyer Tim Danson put it, " [a] ccusing the members of the Toronto Police Service of racism." 5 Denial has not been the exclusive province of the Toronto police. When Ottawa Deputy Chief Larry Hill admitted at a conference on multiculturalism and policing that racial profiling exists within the Ottawa force, the president of the Ottawa Police Association Sergeant Byron Smith stated, " [w] e assert that we don't take part in racial profiling" and "so we kind of distanced ourselves from what (Hill) had to say about it."
6 Similarly, the president of the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police has stated that "it's certainly not something that we're that concerned about because we don't believe that it exists" and "it's our position that (racial profiling) does not exist. We're not doing that." 7 Unfortunately, the targeting of racial minorities for criminal or security-related investigation, solely or in part on the basis of their skin colour, is a real and serious problem in many jurisdictions. In England, for example, the Home Secretary reported in its 2003 annual report on race relations that "the 2001/02 figures showed that black people were eight times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. This was a rise from five If you over-police a group that is already marginalized and discriminated against and then imprison its youth in large numbers for relatively minor offences, it is only logical to assume that those coming out of prison may feel that they have no choice but to turn to greater levels these attributes are at high risk of being stopped on foot or in cars. This explanation is consistent with our find ing s th at, ove rall, black people are m ore likely than others to experience the unwelcome intrusion of being stopped by the police.
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Strong words and actions and yet, the denials continued. In the days following the release of the OHRC Report, senior police officials resumed the denial game. In a press conference, Chief Fantino angrily stated that the report was "totally divorced from the reality of today" 12 and also that "I don't believe our police are so corrupt, so dishonest, so racist, that we need to have body packs on them, cameras on their back and watchdogs at everything they do." 13 Meanwhile, the President of the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police described the report as "predictably disappointing and unfair." The time has come to stop the debate. 15 As the OHRC Report forcefully states, "the time has come to act" and to focus on remedial action. 16 All of the relevant actors must work together to devise strategies to address this insidious problem whose collateral effects are substantial. 17 Using the experience of the Black community in Toronto as my context, the of criminality in order to gain access to scarce resources. Moreover, research into profiling suggests that the sense of disrespect for the rule of law and other conventions that profiling engenders can lead to further offending. Finally, no one should be surprised that if members of a community are treated and repeatedly portrayed as violent criminals, some individuals will start acting that way. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF RACIAL PROFILING
Anti-Black racism is an emotive word that conjures up images of slavery, the Jim Crow laws, the Klu Klux Klan, and hate crimes. This imagery is not confined to the American experience. Contrary to popular mythology and our desire to differentiate ourselves from our southern neighbours, these images of brutality and dominance are part of our own history.
19
For example, Canada has a two hundred year history of slavery that was not formally abolished until 1834. 20 It also has a twentieth century history of de-facto racial segregation 21 and of substantial Klu Klux Klan presence and activities.
22
Associating racial profiling with this imagery no doubt explains, in part, the hostile and defiant manner in which the police, some public officials, and even the public have responded to claims of its existence. Equating racial profiling with overt racism has unfortunately resulted in a misunderstanding of the phenomenon and has stifled rational debate and reform. The targeting of certain racial groups for criminal or security-related investigation is not, generally speaking, a manifestation of overt racism. Most of the officers who use race as a part of a profile are not doing so because of a deep-seated hatred of members of a particular group. 23 Nor is there likely to be a "smoking gun" buried in some police instruction manual that teaches or encourages police officers to target certain racial 24 Ontario Systemic Racism Report, ibid. at 2-3. 
minorities. As the authors of the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System have pointed out:
A comm on feature of [previous] inquiries [into racism] is an emphasis on "systemic" or "institutional" racism as opposed to individual or overt racism. They have generally assum ed tha t the vast m ajo rity of p rofessionals in the criminal justice system under examination do not consciously inten d to treat racial m ino rity people worse than white people. Nevertheless they ha ve rec ogn ized th at even a crim ina l justice staffed w ith we llintentioned professionals m ay operate in subtle and un fair ways that have adverse im pacts on racial minority and indigenous peoples. These inquiries have therefore attempted to identify discriminatory practices with the object of eliminating them .
This Report takes the same approach. The Commission assumed that persons with explicitly hostile attitudes towards racial minority people w ould constitute no more than a tiny minority of professionals within the criminal justice system.
24
That said, our history of overt racism does explain to some extent the failure of many and, in particular, of the police to critically evaluate the assumptions and stereotypes discussed below that have fueled the practice of racial profiling.
Racial profiling is yet another manifestation of systemic racism. It is the unintentional process of "social production of racial inequality in decisions about people and the treatment they receive."
25 How does this occur and how can it be said to be unintentional when a police officer is conscious of the fact that he or she is stopping a person of colour? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to step back and look at the complex process of how we evaluate behaviour. The social science literature suggests that people often make decisions about strangers based on general beliefs or stereotypes associated with the characteristics of the stranger's group (that is, his or her race, gender, or ethnicity). As one commentator has observed:
Social scientists and cognitive psychologists have studied the manner in which people make sense of themselves and others. In encountering the complexities of our daily lives, we attempt to reduce the social wo rld around us into categories to create a more manageable structure. This process of categorization enables us to organize and make decisions about information with less tim e and effort than we would require to confront behaviour and events anew. As the hum an m ind seeks to understand conduct, it looks to salient cues, such as race and ethnicity, and then draws on culturally embedded understandings to evaluate behaviour.
27
OHRC Report, supra note 9 at 6. Using categorizations or schemas to guide evaluations of behaviour is almost inevitable. As the OHRC observed in its report, "[p]ractical experience and psychology both confirm that anyone can stereotype, even people who are well meaning and not overtly biased." 27 This is particularly so in cases where the generalized beliefs are reinforced through previous experiences, the prevailing pop-culture, and the media. The literature also suggests that the faster a decision needs to be made, the more likely it is that the decision-maker will resort to these group stereotypes. It is not a leap of logic to conclude that this is even more so where the decision is perceived to involve officer safety or potential criminal or terrorist activity.
28
In the context of race, this categorization process is known as racialization. It is described as follows: @ attributing personality traits, behaviours and social characteristics to people classified as members of particular races; and @ acting as if race indicates socially significant differences among people.
29
How does racialization operate in the context of policing? It is a common police practice to use historical experiences as a guide to future policing, especially proactive policing, which involves identifying a potential suspect. This is precisely why so many different profiles have been created over the years by the police -the hijacker profile, the smuggler profile, the serial-killer profile, and the terrorist profile. In the context of drugs, a drug-courier profile is widely used in the United States, as most states have incorporated a DEA training program known as "Operation Pipeline" that teaches officers to look for "indicators" of drug trafficking during vehicle stops. 30 In Canada, a drug-courier profile based on "Operation
Pipeline" is now used in a number of provinces.
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While "Operation Pipeline" involves a more formalized use of profiling, a form of informal profiling can arise from personal experiences. One of the most common police experiences is the process of arrest, booking, and appearing in court to testify. experiences, individual police officers likely develop a profile over time of what the usual offender of a particular offence looks like. Based on the limited data available, it would appear that African-Canadian males are over-represented in arrests for certain offences, particularly drug offences. 32 Consequently, the police likely perceive that the usual drug offender is a young, Black male. This profile is also one that has been constantly reinforced by the American experience, the media, and other aspects of our pop-culture.
In Johnson v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) Police Service, Dr. Wanda Thomas Bernard, an anti-racism expert in Nova Scotia, testified about the perpetuation of this stereotype in the media. In his reasons for concluding that Kirk Johnson, one of Canada's most well-known and successful boxers, was the victim of racial profiling, the Chair of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission summarized her evidence as follows:
Dr. Bernard's testimony on the powerful impact of negative media stereotypes of black m ales, both on white people and on b lack m en the m selves, was especially pertinent. She noted the strong tendencies in popular culture and film to focus on black men as criminals, pimps, uneducated persons, and uninvolved as fathers of their children. Her research has exam ined the "cool pose" that young black males som etim es ad opt in response to these m edia portrayals, w hich in turn un intentionally helps to reinforce the stereotypes. The net effect of her testimony was that these negative stereotypes are widely diffused in our culture, so much so that they operate at a subconscious level, and that it requires a considerable amount of training to counteract them.
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It would take an enormous effort for this experience not to influence a police officer's decision-making process and this is likely why it has even influenced more formalized profiling such as Pipeline. Moreover, in R. v. Singh, it was recognized that there is no reason to believe that even a Black police officer would be immune from racial profiling. As O'Connor J. observed:
[i]t seems that any person of any race could consciously or unconsciously believe that persons of a particular race, his own or others, have a propensity toward criminal activity and thus should be targeted for attention by the police. This belief could arise from a variety of sources, including the misinform ed anecdotal musings of associates, inaccurate media information or a misunderstanding of information, reports and studies etc. disseminated by police or governmental agencies.
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Similarly, Professor David Harris, the leading American scholar on this issue, has told us that " [a] ccording to the data, racial disparities in stops, searches, and the like seem to have little or nothing to do with the officer's race." This "usual suspect" stereotype has even led some American commentators to argue that the fact that African-Americans are over-represented in the criminal justice system for some offences makes using race to profile a reasonable and good law enforcement tactic. For example, Bernard Parks, the former Los Angeles Police Chief, who himself is Black, once stated:
[i]n my m ind, it is not a great revelation that if officers are looking for criminal activity, they are going to look at the kin d of people who are listed in crim e reports. At some point, someone figured out that the drugs are delivered by males of his colour driving these kinds of vehicles at this tim e of night. T his isn't brain surgery.
The profile didn't get invented for nothing.
36
Others have argued the because it is statistically reasonable, it should not be a prohibited form of discrimination.
37
It is precisely because there is a police perception that this usual offender categorization process is based on experience and not on race that the police do not think that they are doing anything wrong when they decide, for example, to conduct a pretext vehicle stop of a Black driver. Indeed, it is why we often hear the police respond to profiling allegations as follows:
police deal with crim inal profiling. From my perspective, if there is a description of individuals who have been involved in a crime … or in certain types of crime, you would look at those people who would be suspects; 38 the police can't do their job and be politically correct at the same time;
39
[w]e deal with the circumstances that we're presented with and we make judgments on the basis of what we do within the system , holistically, across the system . We don't look at, nor do we consider the race or ethnicity, or any of that, as factors of how we dispose of cases, or individuals, or how we treat individuals.
40
We also often hear the police say that they "respond to complaints" as though suggesting that they have little or no opportunity to use racial profiling. Part of this is no doubt true. When the police are responding to a complaint and they have a description of the suspect, it is not racial profiling to use racial or ethnic descriptions as part of the investigative process. However, profiling is not, generally speaking, manifested in crime-solving or reactive policing. It typically arises in crime detection or proactive policing on our streets where the police are using their so-called "sixth sense" to identify suspicious circumstances in an effort to find contraband. Proactive policing manifested in vehicle or pedestrian stops invites racial profiling because the "usual offender" stereotype is used to turn entirely innocent events into suspicious circumstances or indicators warranting police intervention. Some of these Troy v. Kemmir Enterprises, supra note 18. In Troy, a gas station employee called 911 to report what she thought was a drug deal or possible robbery. As it turned out, Mr. Troy was simply waiting at the gas station for a friend to direct him to his house. 
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These effects, including distrust of the police and the criminal justice system, have now been documented in the OHRC Report, supra note 9; see also the discussion at supra note 17.
indicators and stereotypes that have triggered police scrutiny of young Black men appear to include: @ driving an expensive vehicle (the "he couldn't afford this unless he were a drug dealer" stereotype); 41 @ being out late at night (the "he must be up to no good" stereotype); 42 @ two or more men in a car or walking down the street wearing distinctive clothing (the "they must be a gang" stereotype); @ walking in a wealthy neighborhood (the "out of place" stereotype); @ standing on the street corner or present in an area purportedly known for drug trafficking (the "this must be a drug deal" stereotype); 43 @ talking on a cell phone in a high crime area (the "he must be a drug dealer" stereotype); 44 or, @ failing to make eye contact with a police officer or quickly leaving the scene of an approaching officer (the "he must have something to hide" stereotype).
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Consequently, while the police may think that differential police treatment is simply the product of good, proactive -rather than biased -policing, this conclusion is based on their perception of who is the usual offender. This subtle and often subjectively unrecognizable process is exactly what categorization, racialization, and racial profiling is all about.
Finally, the police must begin to consciously recognize the effects of using a racialized "usual offender" stereotype in law enforcement and the collateral damage caused by such a practice. 46 In particular, so long as the police see the face of street level crime as Black, it will likely always remain so. Profiling is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more that a group is targeted, the greater the likelihood that criminality will be discovered -particularly for those offences that are prevalent in society, such as drug use. The fact that the targeting reveals a disproportionate number of individuals of a particular group for a particular offence does not mean that members of that group are, in fact, the usual offenders. Indeed, the "hit rate" data (that is, the likelihood of finding drugs or other contraband following a search) that is emerging in the United States reveals that the police are just as likely and, in most cases, more likely to find contraband in stops of White individuals as compared to stops of Ibid. The New York City percentages are actually the arrest rates per stop. In addition, the stops are pedestrian as opposed to vehicle stops.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. This data clearly demonstrates that racial profiling does not work and that it is based on a faulty premise.
Jurisdiction

III. CHANGING POLICE CULTURE
Racial profiling provides a unique challenge to the ability of institutional measures such as anti-racism training and hiring practices to change prevailing police culture because of the perceived reasonableness and unintentional elements discussed earlier. I also w ish to add res s an u nd ers tan dable concern of officers reading this decision . If w e are to be held liab le for violating the H um an R ights Act on the basis of unconscious stereotypes, some might say, how can we ever be sure we are acting correctly? How can we guard against something that is not conscious? Isn't if unfair to hold us to such a high standard ? I think the answ er to this question was given by Constable Christopher Regan at the inquiry. In response to a question about how to deal with racial stereotypes, he replied that you have to work at it. That simple answer is the essence of it. Recognizing the problem and developing techniques to deal with it, both at the personal and institutional leve l, are th e key. Police pride the m selves on being profe ssion als and part of professionalism involves rigorous training on a wide variety of m atters. Learning to recognize and deal with racism is another form of training that the police m ust add to their repertoire in order to con tinue to provide quality policing services, just as learning about domestic violence became a larger part of police training in recent years.
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Consequently, it is imperative that measures be taken to ensure that the anti-racism training, which must include anti-racial profiling training, is comprehensive and effective. 59 In order to accomplish this task, all police forces should be required to hire an anti-racism expert to conduct an external audit of the measures in place. In addition to training, all ranks of the force must be representative of the community. Thus, the hiring and promoting of visible minority officers must be made a priority. 60 Finally, in order for any of these measures to impact on police culture, it is imperative that high-ranking police officials acknowledge the existence of racial profiling and that all forces enact a formal and written anti-racial profiling policy. Kingston and Montreal are the only forces in Canada that have such a policy.
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IV. DATA COLLECTION
As noted earlier, the breeding ground for racial profiling is the day-to-day proactive and crime detection policing that occurs on our streets through either vehicle or pedestrian stops. These "opportunity" encounters are used by the police to find contraband such as drugs or weapons;
62 to monitor the activities of "suspicious" individuals; and to generally engender respect from those groups perceived to be in need of order maintenance. 63 These street level stops are a fertile ground for profiling because they are "low visibility" encounters, thereby shielding the police from having to account for their conduct. Consequently, one of the most significant steps that can be taken to address racial profiling is for the police to be compelled to record, either electronically or in writing, who they stop and investigate. 65 This would include information such as age, gender, race, and ethnic background, where the stop takes place, the reasons for the stop, what investigative measures were taken (for example, a search) and the results. 66 In addition, the police should be required to give the person stopped a ticket confirming that they were stopped, the reasons, and the name of the officer(s). The stop data should then be published on a regular basis and its collection tied to police funding.
The availability of this kind of information would serve a number of important purposes: There is no question that the idea of keeping track of and reporting race-based statistics is a controversial one. Indeed, in Toronto, the police are currently prohibited from analyzing or publishing race statistics following a 1989 ban imposed by the Toronto Police Services Board. 68 The Toronto prohibition came into force following a speech by then Staff-Inspector Julian Fantino on February 16, 1989 to a race-relations committee in North York, Ontario. In his speech, Fantino proclaimed that, based on statistics he had himself compiled, Blacks accounted for most of the crime in the Jane-Finch corridor and that it was this criminal element that was responsible for the "bad blood between police and Blacks." As the Fantino experience demonstrates, one must always be cognizant of the optics and ethics of compiling race-based statistics. Statistics can be misleading and may serve to further stereotype a particular community. Indeed, part of what appears to drive racial profiling is a belief that a "usual offender" profile can be determined based on arrest and conviction statistics. Statistics can also be easily manipulated and used for an improper purpose. While these concerns must inform and ensure that the data collection process is conducted in a fair manner, they do not, on balance, support a prohibition on keeping track of who the police stop. In approaching this issue, one must compare apples to apples. The historical problem with race statistics is that they have only given us part of the picture: who is arrested, convicted, and sentenced. This data is misleading and very susceptible to distortion and abuse because, to the extent that it shows that certain groups are over-represented for certain offences, it cannot tell us whether that over-representation is due to greater criminality in the group or whether it is due to over-policing and targeting or to other systemic factors.
Race-based stop data, on the other hand, is less controversial than arrest data for three reasons. First, it is less misleading because the focus is on police surveillance and not on who gets caught -a fact that may, as noted earlier, be the product of the former. Second, the purpose of stop data is to identify the existence and scope of a serious social problem. 70 Finally, in England and most of the United States, there is now a stop data collection requirement and its implementation was vigorously supported by the Black community. Data collection was also endorsed as a means of addressing racial profiling by the OHRC in its report on racial profiling.
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Of course, sufficient safeguards must be taken to protect the integrity of the process. The data collection design should be left to the experts: university professors or statisticians.
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Anti-racism experts should also be involved. Steps must be put in place to ensure that the police are not fudging or falsifying the data. Safeguards could include the installation of video-cameras in all police cars, 73 a requirement, as in England, that the police issue a written confirmation that the individual was stopped, the reasons, and the name of the officer. While the data has to be collected by the police, its analysis and publication should be done by an independent third party, such as the Racial Diversity Secretariat proposed by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. 74 Finally, it is important to ensure that the Black community and organizations such as the Ontario Human Rights Commission have a voice in the manner and scope of the data collection process.
Before leaving this issue, I want to briefly look at data collection in England, the United States, and Canada.
A. ENGLAND
In England, various acts authorize the police to detain and search individuals whom police reasonably suspect are in possession of contraband. 75 This stop and search power is much broader than the current powers in Canada, which only permit the police to conduct a frisk search for weapons during an articulable cause detention. 76 In an effort to safeguard against Ibid. There are some safety exceptions that exempt an officer from having to comply with some or all of these recording obligations. This data was referred to earlier at note 9. See also, "Police still search more black people" BBC News 
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These findings and concerns led Macpherson to issue the following recommendation with respect to the recording of all stops and not just stops that resulted in searches:
Recommendation 61
That the H om e Secretary, in consultation with Police Services, should en sure that a record is made by police officers of all "stops" and "stops and searches" made under any legislative provision (not just the Police and Crim inal Evidence Act). Non-statutory or so called "voluntary" stops must also be recorded. The record to include the reason for the stop, the outcome, and the self-defined ethic origin of the person stopped. A copy of the record shall be given to the person stopped.
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Recommendation 61 is gradually being incorporated into police practice. 84 As of April 1, 2003, six police forces across Britain will be required to comply with the recommendation using the following definition of a stop: "[w]hen an officer requests a person in a public place to account for themselves -their actions, behaviour, presence in an area or possession of anything." 85 The information is recorded on a hand-held computer and individuals have the option of receiving the record by text, e-mail, or in the mail.
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B. THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, 17 states have passed legislation or an executive order compelling the police to collect data on who they stop. 87 
C. CANADA
In Canada, the only police force that has implemented a mandatory data collection process for police stops is the Kingston Police Service. 91 These bold and courageous moves were prompted by Chief of Police Bill Closs' willingness to address recent allegations of racial profiling in Kingston in a thoughtful and intelligent fashion. In his remarks to the Kingston Police Services Board on May 15, 2003, Chief Closs stated:
Policing is … not always easy because one of the most important ideas in modern criminology, and one that has pretty much revolutionized policing in the last 25 years, is the belief that a good way to prevent serious crime and m otor vehicle collisions is through proactive policing -officers should be watchful, pay attention to anyth ing, respond to reports of suspicious activity -check people and vehicles, often, especially in high crime areas, unusual locations, particular tim es or follow you r ex perience and intuition . B y way of ex am ple approxim ately 40 per cent of all drug arrests begin as a traffic stop, the sam e way pulling over a car for as an example, a driver's license check, remains an effective way of apprehending drunk drivers.
… At issue is whether the race, ethnicity, gender, economic status or age of the person stopped or checked is the only-sole reason for initiating the stop. This practice is comm only referred to as "profiling" and lately we hear it referenced most often as racial profiling. While my officers and this service have never condoned this practice, the publicity generated by the allegations has cast a shadow over th e Kingston Police.… There is a perception by a few , that th e K ing ston P olice profile on the basis of race. Racial profiling is not institutionalized in our service, but the perception cannot be ignored and police must respond to the reality or perception by goin g beyond denial and p atronization. I don't want any person living in ou r com munity to change their behaviour as to avoid being stopped or pulled over by police.… What I am presenting today is a general order on unlawful profiling or bias-based policing.… There are those who believe an order is not necessary as policies on discrimination, race relations and harassm ent are sufficient. I do not agree because it fails to respond to the perception of bias policing.… Today we are setting an even higher standard for Kingston Police officers in that they are being asked to acknowledge and understand the need for a proactive order that recognizes the existence of unlawful profiling/bias-based policing and the need to prevent it. 
93
At the federal level, a data collection project is currently being implemented by Canada Customs that will identify the scope of the profiling of both Arab-and African-Canadians. In a settlement agreement in the racial profiling case of Pieters v. Canada (Department of National Revenue), 94 Canada Customs agreed to conduct a pilot project to keep track of the race and ethnicity of individuals subjected to secondary inspection at ports of entry.
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V. REVAMPING THE PUBLIC COMPLAINTS SYSTEM
Formal measures must also be taken to improve police accountability. One of the ways in which to monitor the performance of a police service and to identify and address systemic problems is through a properly run public complaints process. The current system in Ontario has a number of serious problems. 96 It is not, nor is it perceived to be, objective or independent. 97 This lack of independence is very problematic. The public must feel confident that they have a place to complain about police misconduct and that their complaints will be treated fairly. This is particularly true for an issue as highly charged and sensitive as racial profiling.
No one should be surprised that a member of the Black community in Toronto would not want to file a racial profiling complaint in these circumstances, particularly given Chief Fantino's public statements about profiling. This is very unfortunate. In the criminal justice system, Parliament and our courts have spent the last decade trying to make the system more sensitive to victims. To that end, a number of measures have been taken to reduce revictimization and to promote the reporting of incidents, particularly in the sexual assault context. This same philosophy needs to be incorporated into the public complaints process. Another problem with the Ontario system is accessibility. Victims of profiling need to know who to call. In the United States, the American Civil Liberties Union started a large scale publicity campaign aimed at creating a database of profiling complaints. Large billboards were posted identifying the problem and providing a toll free phone number to call to report an incident. This could be done in Toronto and other areas in relation to the public complaints system. In addition, the following recommendation should be given serious consideration:
10. 6 
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VI. ANTI-RACIAL PROFILING LEGISLATION
Politicians at both the provincial and federal levels must assume a leadership role on this issue.
99 Legislation needs to be enacted at both levels of government prohibiting the use of racial profiling by the police and other state and security-related officials. Such legislation would send an important message to the police; the Black, Aboriginal, and Arab communities and the public that such a practice will not be tolerated. It would also reflect a recognition by Parliament and the provincial Legislatures that profiling is a problem.
In addition to making it unlawful, federal and provincial legislation should make it mandatory for the police to maintain cameras and global positioning systems in their vehicles and to establish a stop data collection scheme. Such legislation should also tie police functioning to compliance. United States citizens to be found carrying contraband; (C) in general, the patterns to select passengers for more intrusive searches resulted in women and minorities being selected at rates that were not consistent with the rates of finding contraband.
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The critical issue in Canada will be whether racial profiling litigants will meet the certification requirements under the relevant Class Proceedings Act. Tanovich, "Using the Charter," supra note 17 at 167-68, 178-86. 113 These recommendations have been updated to reflect recent developments in the jurisprudence.
114
Supra note 64.
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In Ladouceur, ibid., a slim majority of the Court (5-4) held that while the random stop power violated s. 9's guarantee against arbitrary detention, it was a necessary and reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter in order for the police to properly protect us from the consequences of unfit vehicles and unlicenced or intoxicated drivers.
Similarly, in the context of the "war against terrorism," s. 15 forcefully concludes:
In the wake of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as many Arabs, Muslim, Central and South Asians, and
Sikhs, as w ell as other im migrants and Am ericans of foreign descent, were treated with generalized suspicion and subjected to searches and seizures based on religion and national origin, without trustworthy information linking specific individuals to crim inal condu ct. Such profiling has failed to produce tangible benefits, yet has created a fear and mistrust of law enforcement agencies in these comm unities.
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The Act also creates a racial profiling tort and sets out the mandatory protocols that federal law enforcement agencies must enact to combat racial profiling, including data collection. In addition, it ties funding with compliance.
VII. STIMULATING LAW SUITS
Aggrieved individuals must be encouraged to take their cases to court. Racial profiling class-action law suits have been effective in the United States in bringing about systemic change and providing for monetary damages. 110 With the emergence of contingency fees in Ontario, more lawyers may now be prepared to entertain racial profiling lawsuits. 111 The willingness of the bar to accept profiling cases may also increase if judges were prepared to relax or forgo the awarding of costs should the lawsuit not succeed. Anti-profiling legislation and enhanced Charter standards discussed in Part VIII will also serve to stimulate civil actions. In determining the relevant Charter standards to guide the police powers to stop and search individuals under ss. 8 and 9, courts must factor in the relevant social context of racial profiling. This factoring in can be done by using s. 15(1) principles to incorporate an equality-oriented analysis into the determination and application of Charter standards. Such an approach is not without precedent. In Golden, for example, the Supreme Court applied an equality analysis when determining the scope of the common law power of the police to strip search individuals following their arrest. Justices Iacobucci and Arbour, for the majority, held:
VIII. STIMULATING LAW REFORM
we believe it is important to note the submissions of the ACLC and the ALST that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely to represen t a disproportionate number of those who are arrested by police and subjected to personal searches, including strip searches.… As a result, it is necessary to develop an appropriate framework governing strip searches in order to prevent unnecessary and unjustified strip searches before they occur.
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By recognizing equality issues in the interpretation of s. 9, courts will become more alive and sensitive to the concerns of visible minorities. Equality concerns can be reflected, for example, by recognizing that police stops and searches of Black citizens are far more intrusive than stops of other groups, that they have imposed disproportionate burdens on the Black community, and that racial profiling has led to distorted policing.
C. RECOMMENDATION #3: THE CROWN SHOULD BEAR THE ONUS UNDER SECTION 9 OF ESTABLISHING ON A BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES THAT A VEHICLE STOP WAS NOT THE RESULT OF RACIAL PROFILING
One of the problems with the ability of the current s. 9 standards to control racial profiling in the vehicle stop context is the difficulty of proving that race played a role in the stop. As Morden J.A. observed in Brown: 119 Brown, supra note 10 at 254. See Tanovich, "Using the Charter," supra note 17 at 169-72; and Tanovich, "Operation Pipeline," supra note 31 at 53-55 for a discussion of how to build a circumstantial case that the detention corresponded with the phenomenon of racial profiling.
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There will also be similar problems of proof even in the R. v. Simpson (1993) A racial profiling claim could rarely be proven by direct evidence. This would involve an admission by a police officer that he or she was influenced by racial stereotypes in the exercise of his or her discretion to stop a motorist. Accordingly, if racial profiling is to be proven it must be done by inference drawn from circumstantial evidence.
The respondent submits that where the evidence shows that the circumstances relating to a detention correspond to the phenomenon of racial profiling and provide a basis for the court to infer that the police officer is lying about why he or she singled out the accused person for attention, the record is then capable of supporting a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling. I accept that this is a way in which racial profiling could be proven.
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However, even making a circumstantial case will likely require a Herculian effort in the Ladouceur context, since a police officer will be able to simply mask his or her true intent by either claiming that the driver committed a traffic offence or that the purpose of the stop was to confirm that the driver had a valid driver's licence.
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Singh
121 reveals just how difficult establishing an instance of racial profiling will be, particularly if trial judges are unwilling to scrutinize an officer's evidence with the suspicion that is often required. In Singh, a Black police officer was travelling in the opposite direction from a vehicle with three young men of colour. It was late at night in an area of Brampton, Ontario with a high incident of criminal activity. The officer made a U-turn and then stopped the vehicle because he suspected that the backseat passenger was not wearing his seatbelt. One of the occupants testified that when he saw the police car make a U-turn, he advised the driver to stay within the speed limit and made sure that everyone was wearing a seat belt. Given the contraband in the car, he did want to give the officer any reason to pull them over.
Once the officer got to the car, he smelled a strong odour of marijuana and arrested all three occupants. Searches incident to those arrests revealed drugs and firearms. Notwithstanding the following suspicious circumstances suggestive of racial profiling, the claim failed: @ the officer's conduct suggested that he had become fixated on this vehicle after it had passed him in the opposite direction. This included making a "u-turn", following, and eventually catching up to the vehicle; 
IX. CONCLUSION
The use of race by the police as a basis to target individuals for a criminal investigation is not only a manifestation of systemic racism and an unreliable law enforcement tool, but it has had devastating and deadly consequences for the effected communities. Alienation, distrust, over-representation in the criminal justice system, stigmatization, and widespread harassment are only some of the collateral social problems that flow from this practice. The time has come to seriously address this issue in Toronto and to identify its existence in other parts of Canada. Those concerned with this issue are not, in the words of Chief Fantino, "making mischief at our expense" but, rather, attempting to remedy a social problem that causes considerable damage to our society.
